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INTRODUCTION
The latter part of the 20th century saw significant developments in the
fields of health law and bioethics in the United States when advances in
artificial respiration, circulation, nutrition, and hydration made it possible
to maintain biological life well beyond the natural ability of the human
body.2 These life-sustaining clinical interventions gave rise to solemn
questions in law and bioethics not only about the scope of a patient’s right
to refuse such measures, but also about the corresponding extent of a
physician’s obligation to provide them.3
A fairly consistent body of jurisprudence, statutory schemes, and
pronouncements of professional ethics has mostly resolved these
questions—all of which acknowledge in general terms the fundamental
nature of one’s right to accept or refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.
Although the jurisprudence reflects a diversity of thought in terms of legal
theory, courts have demonstrated a consistent appreciation for the same
moral and ethical concerns that have guided the medical profession and
the various state legislatures in their efforts to balance appropriately the
competing interests of the individual in the exercise of autonomy and the
state in the preservation of life.4
2. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 328 (1990);
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
3. See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE:
THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 2.01 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2008).
4. Although the early cases arose in the context of religious liberty under the
First Amendment, the later cases focused on the common law concept of informed
consent to medical treatment and the corollary right not to consent, as well as the
rights to privacy and liberty grounded in the Constitution. See, e.g., Union Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Superintendent of Belchertown St. Sch.
v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J.
1985); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989); Jacobson v.
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Questions in early cases concerning patient autonomy in the context of
end-of-life decision-making focused only on the scope of one’s right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment.5 In contrast with this traditionally negative
focus, the contemporary formulation of the query goes further by asking
whether, or under what circumstances, the law would accommodate the
positive right of a patient not only to refuse treatment in the form of artificial
nutrition and hydration, but also to be rendered unconscious and maintained
in that state without sustenance until death ensues. This question can present
itself in a variety of clinical situations:
A patient in the advanced stages of lung cancer requests morphine and
other sedatives in doses that increase proportionately as the intensity of
his distress deepens with the progression of the disease. Expecting to
eventually receive sedatives in doses that render him permanently
unconscious, the patient asks that nutrition and hydration are withheld
when he becomes unable to ingest food and fluids on his own.
A patient who suffers from esophageal cancer declines further
treatment in the form of artificial nutrition and hydration when the
disease progresses to the point that he can no longer swallow. He also
asks to be sedated immediately to unconsciousness to relieve the
suffering that eventually will accompany the absence of food and
fluids, with death by dehydration to be expected within a few days.
A patient who suffers intractable and interminable pain as a result
of rheumatoid arthritis has asked to be sedated immediately to
unconsciousness to relieve her suffering. Although the disease
process does not impair her natural ability to receive food and
fluids, she requests that artificial nutrition and hydration are
withheld until she dies.
A patient who survived numerous bouts of cancer while raising her
children to adulthood is now in remission. Although she is able to
ingest food and fluids naturally on her own, she is fearful that her
cancer will return and asks to be sedated to unconsciousness and then
be allowed to die by the withholding of artificial nutrition and
hydration.

Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–30 (1905); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
221–22 (1990); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D.
& C.2d 619 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1973); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
5. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 4.
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Although the rights of patients and the authority of physicians in such
cases have been the subject of meaningful discourse among commentators
in the disciplines of health policy and bioethics,6 Louisiana law has not
addressed these issues. In particular, there is a dearth of commentary with
respect to this issue in the context of the Louisiana Natural Death Act (the
“Natural Death Act,” or the “Act”) even though the statute would both
inform and enrich that discussion.7
This silence is not necessarily surprising because many of these
procedures occur in the complexities of the clinical setting, in which the
untrained observer might not readily identify them. In fact, these
procedures may have sometimes been undertaken in silence either to
mitigate the emotional consequences borne by the patient’s family or to
avoid the perplexing legal issues they inevitably present. Notwithstanding
this somewhat silent history, these measures have increasingly become the
subject of discussion in recent mainstream media articles.8 Moreover, the
use of palliative sedation may become more common in the future as our
population ages and economic concerns over the cost of health care
continue to grow. In light of this possibility, citizens should carefully
consider the legal implications of these ethically problematic interventions
before encountering them on a larger scale. This Article is intended to
initiate that discussion in the specific context of the Natural Death Act.
I. DEFINING PALLIATIVE SEDATION: CLINICAL METHODS AND RELATED
LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
The term “palliative sedation”9 refers to the use of sedatives as a
method of relieving intractable pain and other distressing physical
6. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, §§ 7.01–15.
7. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1151–1151.9 (2016).
8. See, e.g., Michael Ollove, Assisted Suicide is controversial, but palliative
sedation is legal and offers peace, WASH. POST (July 27, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/assisted-suicide-is-controversial-butpalliative-sedation-is-legal-and-offers-peace/2018/07/27/e9b02cf8-8922-11e8-8ae
a-86e88ae760d8_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.37caf4e54dbc [https://per
ma.cc/2EUM-3CYE].
9. The practice is also referred to as “terminal sedation,” “deep sedation,”
“sedation for intractable distress in [the] dying [patient],” “total sedation,” “slow
euthanasia,” and “sedation to unconsciousness.” See, e.g., Mark A. Levine, Sedation
to Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care, CEJA REPORT 5-A-08 (2008), https://
journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.ama-assn.org/files/2018-05/coet
1-1305.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7PB-YFK2]; Sef Gevers, Terminal Sedation: A
Legal Approach, 10 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 359, 360 (2003); Robert J. Kingsberry &
Howard M. Ducharme, Two Perspectives on Total/Terminal/Palliative Sedation,
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symptoms that tend to accompany the latter stages of a terminal illness.10
The process generally involves the administration of a sedative in
progressively increasing doses to relieve suffering, even to the point of
eventually rendering the patient unconscious with the understanding that
he would be maintained in that state until death. It is common to withhold
food and fluids in such cases, and death tends to occur within several days.
A. The Relationship Between Palliative Sedation, Assisted Suicide, and
Euthanasia
Because palliative sedation involves an affirmative intervention that
leads to the same result as assisted suicide and euthanasia, it is sometimes
difficult to draw a meaningful distinction between these practices. The
distinction is particularly difficult to make when the sedation is
accompanied by the withholding of nutrition and hydration. It is thus a
challenge to place this palliative intervention on the continuum of end-oflife treatment alternatives other than to say in general terms that it falls
somewhere between the widely accepted “passive” withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and the more controversial
“active” interventions of assisted suicide and euthanasia. Nevertheless,
commentators widely perceive palliative sedation as an essential element
of the right to refuse treatment at the end of life.11
One factor that may distinguish palliative sedation from assisted
suicide and euthanasia is the absence of any direct causal or chronological
relationship between the act of sedation and the patient’s death.12 Palliative
CTR. FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN DIGNITY (2002), http://www.cbhd.org/resources/
endoflife/kingsberry-ducharme_2002-01-24.html [https://perma.cc/J8KF-BUYS].
10. These symptoms can include anxiety, agitated depression, insomnia, and
vomiting. See, e.g., Dieter Birnbacher, Terminal Sedation, Euthanasia and Causal
Roles, MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. (May 31, 2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC1994875/ [https://perma.cc/55DU-YZR6].
11. One author described the relationship between palliative sedation and the
right to refuse treatment in this manner: “The right to refuse treatment and the
availability of palliative [sedation] are inextricably intertwined. The attempt to
think about one without thinking about the other is a formula for making bad law
and bad policy, and for increasing human suffering.” Stephen Arons, Palliative
Care in the U.S. Healthcare System: Constitutional Right or Criminal Act, 29 W.
N. ENG. L. REV. 309, 311 (2007).
12. Because palliative sedation leads to the same end as assisted suicide and
euthanasia, some commentators have argued that they cannot logically or ethically
be distinguished. See the discussion at notes 29–33, infra, and accompanying text.
Despite the blurring of these procedures in the eyes of many observers on both
sides of the autonomy spectrum, evidence tends to suggest that physicians prefer
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sedation involves only the administration of a sedative as a means to
relieve suffering, and it does not itself induce or necessarily accelerate the
moment of death.13 This is true whether the sedative is administered only
proportionately in conformity with the degree of suffering or rapidly to
render the patient unresponsive with all possible haste. Perhaps because
palliative sedation differs from both assisted suicide and euthanasia in
terms of its immediate consequence, commentators perceive it as an
appropriate means of last resort to relieve a patient’s suffering as death
becomes imminent.14 Assisted suicide and euthanasia both have the
immediate and intended effect of causing death. Physician-assisted suicide
involves the prescription of a barbiturate in a dosage intended to terminate
the patient’s life when he ingests it by his own hand.15 Euthanasia, on the
other hand, entails one person’s affirmative act to bring about the death of
another—such as by administering the same lethal concoction the patient
might use in assisted suicide.16 For practical purposes, therefore, palliative
sedation differs from both assisted suicide and euthanasia in terms of
immediate effect; assisted suicide and euthanasia produce the same effect
but differ in terms of the actor’s identity.17

palliative sedation to assisted suicide. See, e.g., Studies reveal physicians’
attitudes on end-of-life care, U. IOWA (Dec. 6, 2004), https://www.eurekalert.org/
pub_releases/2004-12/uoi-srp120304.php [https://perma.cc/B7XA-GGZ2].
13. See Gevers, supra note 9, at 361. As noted in the discussion at note 27,
infra, and accompanying text, however, the maintenance of a patient in a deeply
sedated state for an extended period of time poses its own complications that may
hasten death.
14. These procedures tend to be employed only after less intensive palliative
options have been exhausted. The prevalence of palliative sedation as a means of
providing relief to terminally ill patients has been estimated to fall within the
range of 21% to 54.5%, and it has been suggested that the average time from
sedation to death runs between two and four days. See Rob McStay, Terminal
Sedation: Palliative Care for Intractable Pain Post Glucksberg and Quill, 29 AM.
J.L. & MED. 45, 46 (2003).
15. See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 1, at 125.
16. Id.
17. Dr. Jack Kevorkian, for example, initially helped terminally ill persons
bring about their own deaths and later progressed to administering the fatal
injection himself, thus crossing the line from assisted suicide to euthanasia and
leading to his conviction of second-degree murder. See Dirk Johnson, Kevorkian
Sentenced to 10 to 25 years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 1999), https://w
ww.nytimes.com/1999/04/14/us/kevorkian-sentenced-to-10-to-25-years-in-prison
.html [https://perma.cc/H8Z7-HBPU].
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B. Forms of Palliative Sedation in the Clinical Setting
The practice of palliative sedation in the contemporary clinical setting
manifests itself in two primary expressions: “proportionate palliative
sedation,” commonly referred to simply as “proportionate sedation,” and
“palliative sedation to unconsciousness,” or “sedation to unconsciousness.”
Proportionate sedation is the most prevalent form of these two
interventions.18
Proportionate sedation involves the progressive administration of the
minimum amount of sedative necessary to relieve the patient’s suffering
as it intensifies with the progression of the patient’s disease.19 For
example, physicians commonly administer morphine and other sedatives
to lung cancer patients who are in the terminal stages of their disease in
doses that proportionally increase with the intensity of the patients’
distress typically in the form of pain, dyspnea, and anxiety.20 Although
physicians employ proportionate sedation with the understanding that the
progressive increase in sedatives will eventually render the patient
unconscious or hasten death by hours or days, the practice does not
purpose either of those consequences; rather, these results merely
correspond with the relief of suffering at the margin of either
unconsciousness or death.21 For this reason, proportionate sedation is
generally considered to be an acceptable intervention from an ethical
perspective.
This ethical view is grounded in a fundamental principle of bioethics
known as the rule of double effect, sometimes called the “doctrine of
double effect” or the “principle of double effect.”22 According to the
principle of double effect, it is morally acceptable to engage in an
affirmative act that one might expect to cause harm, but only if that harm
is an unavoidable consequence of an attempt to achieve an identifiable
good.23 The doctrine of double effect serves as an exception to the broader

18. For purposes of this Article, both proportionate palliative sedation and
palliative sedation to unconsciousness are referred to as “palliative sedation.”
19. Parker & Paine, supra note 1, at 123–24.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 206 (4th ed. 1994).
23. Id. The classical formulation of the rule requires that all four of the
following elements be satisfied in order for an action to be morally permissible:
(1) The act must be good, or at least morally neutral (independent of its
consequences)[;]
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bioethics principle of non-maleficence, which holds that a physician must
not intentionally inflict harm.24
The principle of double effect is now widely employed to justify the
use of intense doses of narcotics and sedatives as a palliative measure to
relieve suffering at the end of life, but it came from the Roman Catholic
tradition of defining the circumstances under which therapeutic abortions
may be morally appropriate.25 For example, it might sometimes be
necessary to treat a pregnant woman’s cancer of the cervix by performing
a hysterectomy, or to remove the fallopian tube from a woman who has an
ectopic pregnancy to prevent a fatal hemorrhage.26 In each of these cases,
a physician employs a legitimate medical procedure to save the mother’s
life even though it will inevitably claim the life of the fetus.
Notwithstanding the certainty of that cause and effect, the doctrine of
double effect would justify these procedures from a moral perspective so
long as the physician’s intent was not the fetus’s death. Stated another
way, the physician whose actions caused the fetus’s death would not be
considered to have violated the principle of non-maleficence if: (1) his sole
purpose was to save the life of the mother; and (2) the death of the fetus

(2) [t]he agent intends only the good effect of the act. The bad effect can
be foreseen, tolerated and permitted, but it must not be intended[;]
(3) [t]he bad effect must not be a means to the good effect. If the good
effect were the direct causal result of the bad effect, the agent would
intend the bad effect in pursuit of the good effect[; and]
(4) [t]he good effect must outweigh the bad effect. The bad effect is
permissible only if a proportionate reason is present that compensates for
permitting the foreseen bad effect.
Id. at 207 (subheadings omitted).
The mere legality of one’s decision under state law is not sufficient to invoke
the principle of double effect. Rather, the rule would accommodate the
combination of sedation and another lawful act or omission, such as withholding
nutrition and hydration, only if the sedation does not achieve its palliative
objective by causing death—a fundamental requirement of the double effect
doctrine. Thus, the doctrine would apply when sedation to unconsciousness is
combined with the withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration only if
sedatives are employed to render the patient unconscious, but no further. It is this
distinction that denies ethical justification for physician-assisted suicide, even in
states in which that intervention is lawful.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 1, at 124.
26. Id.
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was merely the unintended, although foreseen and inevitable, result of the
physician’s legitimate purpose.27
The same logic justifies the use of powerful sedatives as a palliative
measure when death is near, at least when a physician administers
sedatives in a manner that proportionally correlates the increase in doses
with the patient’s level of distress. Although these interventions may
eventually render the patient unconscious and even hasten the moment of
death—because of the risk of infection that tends to accompany a
prolonged period of sedation—the realms of both bioethics and law accept
that the physician’s singular intent in employing them is to relieve
suffering, even though the means of achieving that goal will cause a
correlative harm. Grounded in the principle of double effect, proportionate
sedation has gained wide acceptance within the medical profession as an
appropriate way to address a patient’s intractable pain and distress during
the dying process, and these interventions are commonly employed for the
purpose of pain relief.28
Although a patient may be rendered unconscious at some point during
the course of administering proportionate sedation, a physician employs
the intervention known as “sedation to unconsciousness” with the specific
intent of immediately rendering the patient unresponsive and then
maintaining him in an unconscious state until death.29 Because most
candidates for sedation to unconsciousness are unlikely to have any desire
to eat or drink by the time this intervention is considered, it tends not to be
accompanied by the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration.30
27. In its classical expression, the doctrine of double effect would not apply
to every abortion that may be necessary to save the mother’s life. For example, a
woman who has serious heart disease might face a significant risk of death unless
her pregnancy is terminated. An abortion in that case, however, would not satisfy
all four elements of the doctrine of double effect because the action of killing the
fetus—the bad effect—would serve as the means to save the mother’s life—the
good effect. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 22, at 207–08.
28. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 9; Gevers, supra note 9.
29. See, e.g., Mark F. Carr & Gina Jervey Mohr, Palliative Sedation as Part
of a Continuum of Palliative Care, 11. J. PALLIATIVE MED. 76, 76 (2008);
Timothy E. Quill et al., Last Resort Options for Palliative Sedation, 151 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 421 (2009). A third form of sedation, which Quill et al. identified
as “ordinary sedation,” is employed both within and outside of the palliative care
context and provides relief from symptoms without impairing the patient’s level
of consciousness. Id.
30. See Quill et al., supra note 29, at 422 (“Except under very unusual
circumstances, artificial hydration and nutrition are not provided.”); Gevers,
supra note 9, at 361 (“Terminal patients are not eating or drinking substantial
amounts; the patients that are considered for deep sedation [sedation to
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Sedation to unconsciousness is more controversial and less common
than its proportionate counterpart, primarily because of the complex
blurring of intent created when a physician purposefully renders the
patient unable to receive nutrition and hydration naturally and then orders
that food and fluids be withheld.31 Focusing on the intentional, pre-planned
coupling of sedation with the withholding of nutrition and hydration, some
observers have concluded that sedation to unconsciousness is more closely
identified with euthanasia than palliative care.32
The argument that sedation to unconsciousness is akin to euthanasia
is most compelling when the patient’s ability to receive food and fluids
has not been compromised. In one case, for example, a former cancer
patient who was fully able to eat and drink expressed a desire to be sedated
to unconsciousness and then forego the administration of artificial
nutrition and hydration. Although thought to be in remission at the time of
unconsciousness] are not likely to eat and will hardly drink. Although artificial
hydration and nutrition would seem indicated when the patient is no longer able
to eat and drink himself, in some patients—in particular those already dying—it
will be contraindicated because it would only lengthen the dying process. In
others—apart from the risk of pulmonary edema and other adverse effects—it
may be withheld either on the basis of an explicit refusal of the patient, or because
in the final analysis the patient—taking into account his intolerable situation and
the inevitability of an imminent death—has nothing to gain from it.”); Carr &
Mohr, supra note 29, at 79 (suggesting that artificial nutrition and hydration are
neither palliatively nor medically indicated for patients at the terminal stages of
their disease process because they “often feel no hunger and may be unable to
utilize nutrients as a healthy body would”).
31. See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 1, at 123–24.
32. See McStay, supra note 14. Those who challenge the propriety of
palliative sedation to unconsciousness draw from legal notions of causation and
intent to deny any meaningful distinction between that intervention and
euthanasia, simply because death is equally certain with either measure. As one
commentator noted:
While similar to palliative measures as far as the sedation itself is
concerned, withholding of hydration and nutrition brings terminal
sedation into the realm of non treatment decisions. At the same time, to
the extent that the combination of these two measures may shorten the
patient’s life, the practice may be easily associated with euthanasia. It is
no surprise, therefore, that terminal sedation has been called . . . “slow
euthanasia” or “backdoor euthanasia,” suggesting that it should be
dismissed as a covert form of practice which is by many already
considered as unacceptable per se.
Gevers, supra note 9, at 360. See also David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and
Terminal Sedation: Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embracing Euthanasia, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947 (1997).
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her request, she had undergone treatment for several recurring bouts of
cancer throughout her life and was fearful that the cancer would return.
Having fulfilled the responsibility of raising her children and desiring to
avoid the discomfort she had experienced during the prior incidents of
illness, she decided that she would rather die than live with the fear of
another episode of cancer. She eventually located a facility that
accommodated her wishes.33
Whatever reasoning the facility used to justify its acquiescence to this
woman’s request, it was not grounded in the principle of double effect. To
the contrary, the facts of the case suggest strongly that a physician
employed the sedatives in a contrived but thinly veiled effort to provide a
comfortable death without appearing to cross the line from the passive
refusal of treatment to an active intervention logically indistinguishable
from euthanasia.
Not all such cases so closely mirror the practice of euthanasia.
Therefore, it would be premature to universally dismiss the rule of double
effect as a meaningful tool for evaluating all cases in which sedation to
unconsciousness is accompanied by the withholding of artificial nutrition
and hydration.
The euthanasia analogy loses its force altogether when a pre-existing
medical condition drives the patient’s need for artificially delivered
nutrition and hydration. Consider, for example, a patient who suffers from
esophageal cancer. Such a patient might refuse artificial nutrition and
hydration when he becomes unable to swallow and then ask to be sedated
to unconsciousness to relieve the suffering that accompanies the absence
of food and fluids, with death by dehydration to be expected within a few
days. A patient’s decision to withhold nutrition and hydration in such a
case should be considered independently of the fact that he would require
deep sedation to mitigate the suffering that will follow. Under this view, it
would be logical to view the act of sedation and the patient’s refusal of
treatment as separate and unique events, and to attribute death to the
underlying medical condition that precipitated the need for artificially
delivered sustenance.
The key factor that justifies the conclusion that the underlying medical
condition caused death is the absence of any proximate causal relationship
between the act of sedation and the patient’s death. Since the patient’s need
for sedation as a palliative measure would arise from his irreversible
inability to swallow, and since that inability would exist without regard to
his state of consciousness—reflecting merely the natural progression of
33. The author became aware of this case during a personal conversation with
the bioethicist whom the facility consulted after the event.
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the disease—no relationship exists between the act of sedation and the
patient’s death. In the absence of that link, there would be no basis on
which to conclude that the physician undertook the act of sedation with
any intent other than palliation, and the doctrine of double effect would
negate the euthanasia analogy.
One cannot rely on this reasoning in all cases, however, to alleviate
concerns about the use of sedation to unconsciousness as a disguised
method of euthanasia. Assume, for example, that a patient who suffers
intractable pain as a result of rheumatoid arthritis requests that he is
sedated immediately to unconsciousness and that food and fluids
thereafter are withheld. By simultaneously creating and failing to satisfy
the patient’s need for the artificial delivery of nutrition and hydration, this
application of palliative sedation would on its face appear to reflect a
subtle form of euthanasia.34
34. Legal principles of causation would suggest that death was intended in a
case such as this, thus exposing the physician to criminal liability for homicide.
Although prosecution may be unlikely, as a practical matter this risk would exist
even in states in which assisted suicide is lawful. The risk exists because, in
assisted suicide, the patient would administer the death-inducing agent.
Euthanasia, on the other hand, is directly brought about at the physician’s hand.
In light of this distinction, the law may consider physician-assisted suicide more
as a form of suicide with the indirect assistance of a physician rather than as a
homicide directly at his hand.
One might anticipate an argument grounded in the doctrine of double effect
that would purport to distinguish this situation from euthanasia if the sedative is
administered at the minimum dosage necessary to relieve suffering. In effect, this
argument would correlate proportionate sedation with sedation to
unconsciousness when the sedative is applied at the margin of unconsciousness.
Under this view, the patient’s simultaneous loss of both consciousness and the
ability to ingest nutrition and hydration would be merely foreseeable but
unintended consequences of administering the sedative—the sole intent of which
was to relieve suffering. Considered in the double effect context, the bad effects
of the sedative, rendering the patient unable to ingest food and fluids, would be
not the means of achieving the intended good effect of relief from suffering, but
as the inevitable though unintended consequence of it. Those who would deny the
identity between sedation to unconsciousness and euthanasia in such a case may
also focus on the fact that, unlike cases of assisted suicide and euthanasia, the act
of sedating the patient to relieve suffering would not, of itself, result in her
immediate death, whether the sedative is administered proportionally, in
increments, or immediately, with a single dose. See Gevers, supra note 9, at 361.
The ethical basis for this distinction has been the subject of considerable
discussion among moral philosophers, lawyers and practicing physicians. See,
e.g., Levine, supra note 9. The maintenance of a patient in a deeply sedated state
for an extended period of time, however, poses its own complications that might
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C. Palliative Sedation and Professional Medical Standards
The medical profession widely views the practice of palliative
sedation as an appropriate means of last resort to relieve suffering, at least
when the physician administers the sedative in a manner that denies any
direct causal relationship or chronological identity with the patient’s
death.35 Despite the occasional blurring of the procedures involved,
evidence suggests that physicians prefer palliative sedation to assisted
suicide—and, by implication, to euthanasia.36 Moreover, courts tend to
consider decisions concerning the provision of palliative care to be
primarily a matter of medical judgment and professional discretion.37
The American Medical Association (“AMA”) responded to this
judicial deference in 2008 by adopting general clinical policies and
professional guidelines to address the ethical dilemmas extreme palliative
interventions such as sedation to unconsciousness pose.38 These
professional standards limit the provision of palliative sedation to
circumstances of unrelieved, severe physical suffering of patients who are
imminently dying and whose clinical symptoms have been unresponsive
to other aggressive treatment geared to symptom relief. The AMA
guidelines also recognize that extreme palliative interventions should be
employed only: (1) as a last resort; (2) with the sole intent to relieve

hasten death. This fact is true whether the sedative is administered proportionately
with the degree of suffering, or rapidly in order to render the patient insensate and
unresponsive with all possible haste.
35. Gevers, supra note 9, at 361.
36. See, e.g., Studies reveal physicians’ attitudes on end-of-life care, supra note
12, and statistical evidence reported therein. According to Lauris Kaldjian, NMD,
the lead investigator in the studies cited in this article, physician attitudes appear to
be related to their experience in caring for terminally ill patients and the frequency
with which they attend religious services: “[T]hose who had cared for a greater
number of terminally [ill] patients in the preceding year were more opposed to
assisted suicide and also more supportive of terminal sedation . . . , [and among
those physicians] [t]here seemed to be both a greater willingness to be rigorous in
end-of-life care but also less willingness to cross that line into actually intending
death.” Id. See also Levine, supra note 9, and references cited therein.
37. See, e.g., Gevers, supra note 9, at 366 (“What is needed is not so much
specific legislation, but authoritative clinical guidelines providing a workable
protocol on how physicians should proceed.”).
38. See, e.g., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Principles of Medical Ethics §§ I,
VII (AM. MED. ASS’N 2001); Levine, supra note 9.
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suffering rather than to cause or hasten death; and (3) in a manner that does
not directly cause death.39
For all practical purposes, the AMA standards incorporate the ethicsbased rule of double effect. The standards also reflect the manner in which
the law has traditionally balanced the patient’s interest in selfdetermination and the state’s interest in preserving life. Finally, as borne
out in the following discussion, the AMA guidelines weigh these
competing interests in much the same way as does the Natural Death Act,
creating an effective symmetry between these ethical standards and
Louisiana law.40 The Natural Death Act also implicitly reflects the manner
in which the courts have weighed these interests in the constitutional
context.
II. THE STATUS OF SEDATION TO UNCONSCIOUSNESS AS A MATTER OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By definition, sedation to unconsciousness arises in the context of
treatment at the end of life. It entails not only the withholding of artificial
nutrition and hydration, but also subjecting the patient to deep sedation to
relieve the distress expected to follow the absence of food and fluids. This
integration of passive and active steps suggests that the same body of law
that relates to one’s “negative” right to refuse medical treatment and one’s
“positive” right to a physician’s assistance in bringing about his death
should inform the legal implications of sedating a patient to
unconsciousness.
A. The “Negative” Right of a Terminally Ill Patient to Withhold or
Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment
The body of constitutional jurisprudence concerning the refusal of
medical treatment in the United States originated in 1891, when the
Supreme Court first addressed the sanctity of one’s right to control his own
body in the health care context. Holding that a plaintiff in a personal injury
39. In addition, the AMA guidelines recommend that: (1) the patient or an
authorized surrogate provide an explicit informed consent to the use of an extreme
palliative intervention; (2) reasonable steps be taken to ensure that physicians are
educated about the proper clinical context for their use; (3) physicians consult
with an interdisciplinary team that includes an expert in palliative care before
recommending their use to ensure that it is the most appropriate course of
treatment; and (4) health care facilities establish an internal mechanism to review
all cases in which patients request these measures. Levine, supra note 9.
40. See the discussion infra at notes 111–47 and accompanying text.
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case cannot be compelled to undergo a pretrial medical examination
without consent, the Court stated:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.41
Implicit in this notion of bodily integrity is the concept that a patient has
the right to refuse medical treatment.42
Although courts have cited different premises as the theoretical basis
for the right to refuse medical treatment, courts have come to apply this
right even when the patient’s refusal of treatment is reasonably expected
to result in death:
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going
self determination. It follows that each man is considered to be
master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind,
expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other
medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation
or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not
permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the patient
by any form of artifice or deception.43
Courts throughout the United States thus readily acknowledge that a
competent person possesses what one might broadly describe as the right
to refuse medical treatment, and courts are willing to recognize this right
41. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
42. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914),
overruled in part by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). Justice Cardozo
described the doctrine of informed consent in these terms: “Every human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” Id. at 93. See also
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 2.06[A] (“The right to refuse medical
treatment is a corollary of the requirement of consent to medical treatment and
has always been implicit in it.”).
43. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960). Although many of
the early cases arose in the context of competent patients who refused treatment
either on religious grounds or simply as a matter of personal preference, the modern
so-called “right to die” cases corresponded with the emergence of advanced medical
technology that enabled physicians to sustain life by employing a combination of
devices for artificial respiration, circulation, feeding, and hydration. See, e.g.,
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
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unconstrained by the fact that the refusal will result in an otherwise
avoidable death.44
The Supreme Court first addressed this question in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health45 in the context of withdrawing artificial
nutrition and hydration from a patient in a persistent vegetative state. After
being ejected from her car in an accident, Nancy Cruzan was discovered
lying face down in a ditch, unconscious and without any detectable cardiac
or respiratory function. Paramedics were able to restore her heartbeat and
breathing prior to transporting her to the hospital, but Nancy remained in
a coma for approximately three weeks before progressing to a vegetative
state in which she exhibited no evidence of significant cognitive function.
Although she was able to receive some amount of nutrition orally, her
physicians surgically implanted a gastronomy tube to better provide
nutrition and hydration. Nancy’s physicians were of the opinion that this
procedure would enable her to live for another 30 years, but only in a
persistent vegetative state.
In light of this prognosis, and believing that Nancy would have refused
artificial nutrition and hydration if she were capable of speaking for
herself, her parents requested that the physicians remove the gastronomy
tube and allow her to die.46 Nancy’s parents sought judicial authorization
to withdraw treatment when the hospital refused to honor their request
without court approval.
Although the trial court authorized the hospital to withdraw
treatment,47 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed by a divided vote. The
Court acknowledged that one’s right to refuse treatment was implicit in
the common law doctrine of informed consent, but it expressed skepticism
about the application of that doctrine under the specific facts of Nancy’s
44. See, e.g., MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, and cases cited therein.
See also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 328.
45. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261. In re Quinlan was the seminal decision in the
U.S. concerning the refusal of life-sustaining treatment. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
46. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 267.
47. The trial court found that a person in Nancy’s condition had a
fundamental right under the Missouri and U.S. Constitutions to refuse or direct
the withdrawal of “death-prolonging procedures.” Id. at 261. The court also
found:
Nancy’s “expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in somewhat serious
conversation with a housemate friend that if sick or injured she would
not wish to continue her life unless she could live at least halfway
normally suggests that given her present condition she would not wish
to continue on with her nutrition and hydration.”
Id. at 268 (citation omitted).
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case.48 The Court also expressed doubt as to whether such a right existed
under the U.S. Constitution,49 and it was unwilling to construe the
Missouri Constitution as embodying a right of privacy that would “support
the right of a person to refuse medical treatment in every circumstance.”50
Finally, noting that Missouri’s living will statute embodied a policy that
strongly favored the preservation of life,51 the Court held that “no person
can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities
required under [the living will statute] or the clear and convincing,
inherently reliable evidence absent here.”52 The Missouri Supreme Court
thus reversed the decision of the trial court on the grounds that the record
did not reflect sufficient evidence to indicate that Nancy would have
wanted treatment to be withdrawn.53
The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to consider the
question of whether the U.S. Constitution would accord Nancy Cruzan a
right that “would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
from her” under the specific circumstances of her case.54 In addressing that
question, the Court referred to its own prior jurisprudence concerning the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in light of decisions by
various state courts concerning the doctrine of informed consent.55
48. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 416–17 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
49. Id. at 417–18.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 419–20.
52. Id. at 425.
53. Finding that Nancy’s statements to her roommate regarding her desire to
live or die under certain conditions were “unreliable for the purpose of
determining her intent,” id. at 424, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that
the evidence was “insufficient to support the co-guardians claim to exercise
substituted judgment on Nancy’s behalf.” Id. at 426. Finally, the court expressed
its view that “[b]road policy questions bearing on life and death issues are more
properly addressed by representative assemblies” than judicial bodies. Id.
54. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
55. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–30 (1905)
(balancing an individual’s liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox
vaccination against the state’s interest in preventing disease); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (recognizing that prisoners possess “a
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment”); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (finding that liberty
interests were implicated when an inmate is transferred to a mental hospital for
mandatory behavior modification treatment); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600
(1979) (holding that an individual has a substantial liberty interest in not being
confined unnecessarily for medical treatment). According to the Court in Cruzan:
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The Supreme Court expressed the issue before it as “whether the
United States Constitution prohibits Missouri from choosing the rule of
decision which it did.”56 In addressing that question, the Court first noted
the logical correlation between the common law doctrine of informed
consent and the right of a competent individual to refuse medical
treatment.57 The Court then established the general framework for its
analysis by noting that the opinions in the various lower courts regarding
the scope of that right “demonstrate both similarity and diversity in their
approaches to decision of what all agree is a perplexing question with
unusually strong moral and ethical overtones.”58 Recognizing the
significance of those moral and ethical issues from the perspectives of law
and public policy, the Court said that in deciding “a question of such
magnitude and importance . . . it is the [better] part of wisdom not to
attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the
subject.”59
Having so framed the question, the Court focused its inquiry on the
Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription against deprivations of liberty

At common law, even the touching of one person by another without
consent and without legal justification was a battery . . . . This notion of
bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that informed
consent is generally required for medical treatment . . . . The logical
corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally
possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment. Until . . .
the seminal decision in In re Quinlan, the number of right-to-refusetreatment decisions was relatively few. Most of the earlier cases involved
patients who refused medical treatment forbidden by their religious
beliefs, thus implicating First Amendment rights as well as common-law
rights of self-determination. More recently, however, with the advance
of medical technology capable of sustaining life well past the point
where natural forces would have brought certain death in earlier times,
cases involving the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment have
burgeoned . . . . As these cases demonstrate, the common-law doctrine
of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a
competent individual to refuse medical treatment. Beyond that, these
cases demonstrate both similarity and diversity in their approaches to
decision of what all agree is a perplexing question with unusually strong
moral and ethical overtones.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269–70, 277 (citations omitted).
56. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 277–78 (quoting Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202
(1897)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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without due process of law, and it inferred from its prior decisions “[t]he
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.”60 The Court went on to
qualify the patient’s right, however, by noting that the finding of a liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause was only the beginning of the
inquiry. Rather, the Court stated that whether a person’s constitutional
rights have been violated “must be determined by balancing his liberty
interests against the relevant state interests.”61
With respect to those state interests, the Court took notice of the fact
that Missouri had adopted its high evidentiary standard in reliance “on its
interest in the protection and preservation of human life, and there can be
no gainsaying this interest.”62 The Court further noted that all states

60. Id. at 278. In support of this inference, the Court cited Jacobson v.
Massachusetts. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24–30 (balancing an individual’s liberty
interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine against the State’s interest in
preventing disease). The Court further noted that its decisions prior to the
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment analyzed
searches and seizures involving the body under the Due Process Clause and were
thought to implicate substantial liberty interests. Id. (citing Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957)) (“As against the right of an individual that his person
be held inviolable . . . must be set the interests of society . . . .”). The Court also
cited Washington v. Harper. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221–22 (in the course of holding
that a State’s procedures for administering antipsychotic medication to prisoners
were sufficient to satisfy due process concerns, the Court recognized that
prisoners possess “a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment”); see also id. at 229 (holding that “[t]he forcible
injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a
substantial interference with that person’s liberty”); Vitek, 445 U.S. at 490
(holding that the transfer to mental hospital coupled with mandatory behavior
modification treatment implicated liberty interests); Parham, 442 U.S. at 600
(“[A] child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being
confined unnecessarily for medical treatment . . . .”); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–79.
61. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
321 (1982) (citing Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982))) (internal quotation
marks omitted). These state interests include: (1) the interests in preserving life,
see, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1239 (N.J. 1985); (2) preventing suicide,
id. at 1223; (3) preserving the ethical integrity of the medical profession, id.; and
(4) protecting members of vulnerable groups, see, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
62. Cruzan, 497 U.S at 280. Although the Court addressed only the
constitutionality of Missouri’s heightened evidentiary standard for confirming
that a surrogate’s decision reflects the patient’s preference, the law is clear that
the state’s interest applies even when the patient speaks for himself:
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demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious
crime and that a majority of states impose criminal penalties on persons
who assist others in committing suicide.63 Even with respect to a
competent patient who expresses an informed refusal of nutrition and
hydration, the Cruzan Court opined that “[w]e do not think a State is
required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary
decision by a physically able adult to starve to death.”64 Finally, the Court
noted that the state has an unqualified interest in the preservation of life:
“[W]e think a State may properly decline to make judgments about the
‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert
an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed
against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual.”65
The Cruzan Court thus effectively dispensed with any notion that a
patient might enjoy an unbridled liberty interest in the refusal of lifesustaining treatment, whether the patient refuses directly or indirectly by
a surrogate.
B. The “Positive” Right of a Terminally Ill Patient to Receive the
Assistance of a Physician in Committing Suicide, and the Problematic
Relationship Between Sedation to Unconsciousness, Assisted Suicide,
and Euthanasia
In contrast with the mere tranquilizing effect of sedation to
unconsciousness, assisted suicide involves the self-administration of a
barbiturate in a dosage a physician prescribes for the specific purpose of
The choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious
and overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may legitimately seek to
safeguard the personal element of this choice through the imposition of
heightened evidentiary requirements. It cannot be disputed that the Due
Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing
life-sustaining medical treatment. Not all incompetent patients will have
loved ones available to serve as surrogate decisionmakers. And even where
family members are present, “[t]here will, of course, be some unfortunate
situations in which family members will not act to protect a patient.”
Id. at 281 (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (N.J. 1987)). A state is entitled
to guard against potential abuses in such situations. Similarly, a state is entitled to
consider that a judicial proceeding to make a determination regarding an
incompetent's wishes may very well not be an adversarial one, with the added
guarantee of accurate factfinding that the adversary process brings with it. See id.
See also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1990).
63. Cruzan, 497 U.S at 281.
64. Id. at 280.
65. Id. at 282.
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enabling the patient to immediately terminate his own life. Euthanasia, on
the other hand, entails one person’s affirmative act to bring about the death
of another—generally by the administration of a lethal dose of medication
such as that employed in assisted suicide. Although the practices of
sedation to unconsciousness, assisted suicide, and euthanasia differ in
terms of the actor’s identity and clinical method, they are similar because
each represents an active intervention certain to result in the patient’s
death, whether immediate—as in the case of assisted suicide and
euthanasia—or eventual—as in the case of sedation to unconsciousness.
This common result renders all of these measures ethically and morally
problematic.66
Euthanasia and assisted suicide are especially dubious from an ethical
perspective because the procedures purposely result in the patient’s
immediate death. The ethical challenges sedation to unconsciousness
poses, however, vary with the manner and circumstances under which the
physician administers the sedative, making questions about the propriety
of the practice both subtler and more case-specific than the infamy
commonly associated with euthanasia and assisted suicide.
Such weighty ethical concerns invoke equally significant questions of
law, and the Supreme Court has twice issued writs of certiorari to address
facial challenges asserted on Equal Protection and Due Process grounds
concerning the constitutionality of statutory prohibitions against assisted
suicide. Washington v. Glucksberg67 and Vacco v. Quill68 represent the
Court’s most recent expressions concerning this issue, and they reflect the
full evolution of thought concerning the legal implications of end-of-life
decision-making in the contexts of both the right to “passively” refuse lifesustaining treatment and the right to “actively” receive an intervention that
will cause death directly and immediately. Although these cases involved
only the constitutional implications of physician-assisted suicide, the
Court informed its inquiry concerning that issue with reference to the
closely related practice of sedation to unconsciousness.
Four physicians, three gravely ill patients, and Compassion in Dying,
a nonprofit organization that counsels people who are considering assisted
suicide, initiated Glucksberg.69 These plaintiffs asserted the existence of a
substantive due process right to commit suicide with the assistance of a
66. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.01[C].
67. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
68. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
69. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707–08. Glucksberg was initiated in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev’d, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.
1995), aff’d en banc, 79 F.3d 790, rev’d, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
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physician, and the district court agreed that they possessed such a right.70
Relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey71 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,72 the court held that Washington’s ban on assisted suicide placed
“an undue burden on the exercise of [that] constitutionally protected
liberty interest.”73
Although a panel of the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the district
court decision,74 the appeals court later affirmed the lower court’s holding
when rehearing the case en banc,75 concluding that “the Constitution
encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and
manner of one’s death—that there is, in short, a constitutionally
recognized ‘right to die.’”76 More specifically, and in light of that liberty
interest, the Ninth Circuit held that Washington’s prohibition against
assisted suicide was unconstitutional “as applied to terminally ill
competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication
prescribed by their physicians.”77

70. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 708. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed
“the existence of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which
extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to
commit physician-assisted suicide.” Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459.
They complained that Washington’s statutory prohibition against “caus[ing]” or
“aid[ing]” a suicide violated, on its face, the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. Id. at 1458–59. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1998).
Washington’s Natural Death Act specifically excluded from the definition of a
suicide “[t]he withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment” in
accordance with the patient’s direction. Id. § 70.122.070(1) (1998). See also
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent
part: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
72. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 328 (1990).
73. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1465. The District Court also held
that the Washington statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1467. The
Ninth Circuit, however, did not reach the equal protection issue when the case
came before that court on appeal. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d 586, aff’d en
banc, 79 F.3d 790, rev’d, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
74. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594.
75. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 798.
76. Id. at 816.
77. Id. at 837. The Ninth Circuit did not find the Washington statute to be
invalid on its face. Id.
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The Supreme Court reversed.78 The Court framed the issue before it
as “whether the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause
includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to
assistance in doing so.”79 In resolving that question, the Court undertook
a careful review of “our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices”
that treated as a crime any act of assisting a person in the commission of
suicide.80 After noting that most states treated one’s assistance in a suicide
as a crime at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,81 that nearly
every state defined assisted suicide as a crime at the time the Court was
deciding the case, and that federal law expressly prohibited the use of
federal funds to support the commission of suicide with the assistance of
a physician,82 the Court found in these facts a longstanding tradition that
represented “the States’ commitment to the protection and preservation of
all human life.”83
Though recognizing that the Court in Cruzan had “assumed, and
strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional
right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment,”84 the Court refused
to extend its assumption to embrace assisted suicide. After emphasizing
that the right to refuse treatment was grounded in the common law notion
of informed consent rather than “abstract concepts of personal autonomy,”
the Court noted:
Given the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery,
and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse
78. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735–36. The majority opinion in Glucksberg was
joined by Justices Scalia, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justices O’Connor,
Ginsberg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter each filed concurring opinions. Id. at 736–92.
79. Id. at 723.
80. Id. at 710.
81. Id. at 715. The Court also noted that the American Law Institute’s Model
Penal Code, which prohibited the “aiding” of a suicide, played a significant role
in prompting many states in the 20th century to enact or revise their bans against
assisted suicide. Moreover, the Court noted that those bans had been reaffirmed
in the years prior to Glucksberg and Quill, and that other changes had been
wrought in the law to protect the interests of the terminally ill, such as the
enactment of “living will” statutes, other provisions that expressly recognized the
role of surrogates in making health care decisions, and provisions dealing with the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 715–16.
82. Id. at 710. The Court noted that, at the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
44 states had statutes prohibiting assisted suicide, and three others had enacted such
statutes before the case reached the Supreme Court. Id. at 710–11 n.8.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 720.
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unwanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely
consistent with this Nation’s history and constitutional traditions.
The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may
be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal
protection. Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably
regarded as quite distinct.85
The Court thus based its holding primarily on the distinction between
a person’s right to refuse an unwanted touching and one’s right to demand
a desired one, again with reference to the support it found in “this Nation’s
history and [] traditions.”86
Quill is like Glucksberg in that three physicians and three gravely ill
patients asserted interests in assisted suicide.87 In contrast with the due
process focus of Glucksberg, however, Quill raised equal protection
concerns.88 More specifically, the plaintiffs in Quill argued that because
New York law permitted competent patients to refuse life-sustaining
treatment, and because the refusal of such treatment was tantamount to
assisted suicide, the state’s ban on the latter practice violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.89
The lower court rejected the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.
Focusing on the state’s “obvious legitimate interests in preserving life, and
in protecting vulnerable persons,” the court found it “hardly unreasonable
or irrational for the State to recognize a difference between allowing nature
to take its course, even in the most severe situations, and intentionally
using an artificial death-producing device.”90
85. Id. at 725.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 797. Quill and Glucksberg were also similar in the sense that the
patients in both cases died before the issues reached the Supreme Court. Id. at
707; Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997).
88. Quill, 521 U.S. at 797.
89. Id. The New York law at issue in Quill provided that “[a] person is guilty
of manslaughter in the second degree when . . . [h]e intentionally causes or aids
another person to commit suicide. Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C
felony.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1998). In contrast with this
express prohibition against aiding a suicide, New York law quite clearly provided
that a competent person had the right to refuse medical treatment, even if his
refusal would result in death. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960–79 (McKinney
1993); see Quill, 521 U.S. at 797 n.2.
90. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d, Quill, 521
U.S. 793.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that New York law
does not treat equally all competent persons who are in the final stages of
a terminal illness and who wish to hasten their deaths.91 The court based
this conclusion on the fact that:
“[T]hose in the final stages of terminal illness who are on lifesupport systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the
removal of such systems; but those who are similarly situated,
except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment,
are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering prescribed
drugs.” . . . “[T]he ending of life by [the withdrawal of life-support
systems] is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide.”92
The appeals court then concluded that New York’s statutory distinction
between assisted suicide and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
was not rationally related to any legitimate state interest and, therefore,
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.93
Consistent with its reversal of the Ninth Circuit in Glucksberg under
the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit’s
Equal Protection analysis in Quill. Denying that it should treat the refusal
of treatment and assisted suicide the same simply because they both hasten
death,94 the Court focused on the fact that the New York statute drew no
unlawful distinction between terminally ill persons because “[e]veryone,
regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a
suicide.”95 The majority drew support for its holding from the AMA’s
amicus brief, which contended that members of the medical profession
“widely recognized and endorsed” the substantive distinction between
suicide and the refusal of treatment.96 The Court stated that this distinction
was “important,” “logical,” and “rational,” and that it “comports with
fundamental legal principles of causation and intent.”97

91. Quill, 80 F.3d 716.
92. Quill, 521 U.S. at 798 (quoting Quill, 80 F.3d at 727, 729) (alteration in
original).
93. Id. at 799.
94. Id. at 809. As in Glucksberg, Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion
in Quill and Justices Scalia, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined him;
Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter each filed concurring
opinions. Id. at 809–10.
95. Id. at 800.
96. Id. at 801.
97. Id. at 800–01.
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The Quill Court found the distinction between assisted suicide and the
refusal of life-sustaining treatment relevant from a causation perspective
by noting that a patient who refuses treatment will die from the natural
progression of the underlying disease, whereas a patient who receives a
lethal concoction will die from the body’s reaction to the foreign matter.98
In terms of intent, the Court found that physicians who comply with a
patient’s request to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment do not
necessarily act with the intent of causing death,99 but that those physicians
who provide assistance in committing suicide “must, necessarily and
indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made dead.”100
The Quill Court, however, refused to infer a physician’s intent to cause
death when employing aggressive palliative measures to control a
patient’s pain.101 This distinction between palliative sedation, on the one

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 802 (quoting Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.,
2d Sess., 367 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Whether intentionally or not, this conclusion is consistent with the line
of reasoning the American Hospital Association presented in its amicus brief
concerning the finding of intent. That argument focused on the different responses
one might expect to follow when a patient continues to live after the withdrawal
of treatment, on the one hand, and after a failed suicide attempt, on the other. The
patient who requested only the withdrawal of treatment presumably would be
allowed to continue living. In contrast, the only rational course of action for the
patient who sought assistance in committing suicide would be to try again. This
argument provides a meaningful contextual reference point in the clinical setting
for the doctrine of double effect as a supplement to the traditional legal notion of
intent, which relates to “the exercise of intelligent will, the mind being fully aware
of the nature and consequences of the act which is about [t]o be done, and with
such knowledge, and with full liberty of action, willing and electing to do it.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). This argument
not only accommodates the unique nature of the relationship that exists between
a physician and a patient; it also implicitly recognizes that the physician-patient
relationship is governed by professional norms that justify a presumption that the
physician always acts with the intent to preserve life rather than cause death.
101. Quill, 521 U.S. at 807–08 n.11 (rejecting the respondents’ argument that
“the State irrationally distinguishes between physician-assisted suicide and
‘terminal sedation,’ a process respondents characterize as ‘induc[ing] barbiturate
coma and then starv[ing] the person to death’”). The Court recognized that the
practice of palliative sedation is based on informed consent and the principle of
double effect: “Just as a State may prohibit assisting suicide while permitting
patients to refuse unwanted lifesaving treatment, it may permit palliative care
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hand, and euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide on the other,
acknowledged implicitly the principle of double effect and embraced the
reasoning a group of bioethics professors espoused in their amicus brief:
Providing medication to control pain has always been a legitimate
and lawful medical act, even if death . . . is risked. Most invasive
medical interventions carry the risk of death or disability. But if a
patient dies during surgery, the surgeon is not guilty of homicide.
This is because there is a real difference between an intended
result and an unintended but accepted consequence of medical
care where the goal is to benefit the patient.102
Although the holdings in Glucksberg and Quill invoked the doctrine
of double effect to distinguish palliative sedation from physician-assisted
suicide from a constitutional perspective, Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and
Stevens expressly limited their concurring opinions to the specific facts
under review in those cases. Justice O’Connor, for example, suggested that
the Court might reach a different result if presented with an as-applied
challenge that established a legal impediment to effective pain relief.
Emphasizing that neither Washington nor New York law raised any barriers
to a physician’s ability to manage a patient’s pain, she explained that it was
unnecessary for the Court to reach the question of whether there exists a
“constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of
[one’s] imminent death.”103 More specifically, Justice O’Connor noted that
the plaintiffs in Glucksberg and Quill had raised only facial challenges to
the laws of Washington and New York and noted that “in these States a
patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing
great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication, from qualified
physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point of causing
unconsciousness and hastening death.”104 Justice O’Connor thus qualified
implicitly her concurrence upon the availability of sedation to
unconsciousness.105 Justice Breyer adopted the same view:
[A]s Justice [O’Connor] points out, the laws before us do not force
a dying person to undergo [severe physical] pain. Rather, the laws
related to that refusal, which may have the foreseen but unintended ‘double effect’
of hastening the patient’s death.” Id.
102. Brief for Bioethics Professors Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
18, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858, 96-110).
103. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
104. Id. at 736–37.
105. Id. at 736.
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of New York and of Washington do not prohibit doctors from
providing patients with drugs sufficient to control pain despite the
risk that those drugs themselves will kill . . . . [W]ere state law to
prevent the provision of palliative care, including the
administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life—
then the law’s impact upon serious and otherwise unavoidable
physical pain . . . would be more directly at issue. And as Justice
[O’Connor] suggests, the Court might have to revisit its
conclusions in these cases.106
Justice Breyer also indicated that he would go one step further in the
face of an impediment to effective pain control by framing the question
more specifically: “[A]t its core would lie personal control over the
manner of death, professional medical assistance, and the avoidance of
unnecessary and severe physical suffering—combined.”107 Justice Breyer
thus implied that he would find a due process “right to die with dignity” if
state law prevented the provision of sedation to unconsciousness.108
Justice Stevens similarly qualified his concurrence, stating that the
Court’s holding in Glucksberg:
[D]oes not foreclose the possibility that some application of [a
statute that prohibits assisted suicide] may impose an intolerable
intrusion on the patient’s freedom. There remains room for
vigorous debate about the outcome of particular cases that are not
necessarily resolved by the opinions announced today. How such
cases may be decided will depend on their specific facts. In my
judgment, however, it is clear that the so-called “unqualified
interest in the preservation of human life” . . . is not itself sufficient
to outweigh the interest in liberty that may justify the only possible
means of preserving a dying patient’s dignity and alleviating her
intolerable suffering.109
Each of these concurring opinions suggests that it was only the absence of
a legal impediment to the availability of sedation to unconsciousness in
Washington or New York that enabled Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and
Stevens to join the majority of the Court in Glucksberg and Quill.
At their cores, the holdings in the assisted suicide cases of Glucksberg
and Quill reflect a subtle stand-off between members of the Court who
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Id. at 790.
Id. at 791.
Id. at 751–52 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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held different visions about the appropriate balance between the patient’s
right to self-determination and the state’s interest in preserving life.110 The
only collective certainty, or least common denominator, to be gleaned
from these cases is that a terminally ill patient does not possess a
constitutional right to assisted suicide on either due process or equal
protection grounds in a state that imposes no legal impediment to effective
pain relief. Although the concurring opinions suggest that such relief
would include sedation to unconsciousness, the majority opinion did not
address specifically the scope of a patient’s right to palliative care.
III. THE STATUS OF SEDATION TO UNCONSCIOUSNESS UNDER THE
LOUISIANA NATURAL DEATH ACT
The unresolved question about the legal status of sedation to
unconsciousness can leave physicians just as unsettled about the
consequences of employing aggressive palliative measures as they were
about complying with their patients’ requests to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment prior to the enactment of advance directive statutes.
The uncertainty in both situations stems from the inherent conflict between
the patient’s interest in autonomy and the state’s interest in preserving life.
The Natural Death Act111 provides a meaningful reference point for
addressing this question in Louisiana. Although the range of contemporary
palliative care options now available might have been unknown to the
legislature at the time it adopted the Act, the statute is broad enough in
purpose, policy, and expression of legislative intent to inform our
understanding about the scope of a patient’s right under Louisiana law to
receive palliative care when exercising his right to withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining treatment.

110. Apparently relying on the doctrine of double effect, the majority of
justices refused to recognize one’s right to assisted suicide, but they found that
sedation to unconsciousness posed no meaningful challenge to the state’s interest
in preserving life. Although Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and Stevens agreed with
the majority under the specific facts of Glucksberg and Quill, they suggested that
they might reach a different result in an “as applied” challenge to an assisted
suicide ban, particularly where there exists a legal impediment to the availability
of palliative sedation. See id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring), 741–42 (Stevens,
J., concurring), and 790 (Breyer, J., concurring). These concurring justices found
it unnecessary to address that question in Glucksberg and Quill simply because
the plaintiffs there had asserted only a facial challenge and had not presented
evidence of such an impediment.
111. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151 (2019).
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A. The Purpose and Scope of the Natural Death Act
Like its counterparts in other jurisdictions, the Act reflects the
negative implication of the doctrine of informed consent: if a physician is
obligated to obtain a patient’s consent prior to providing treatment, the
clear inference is that the patient has a corresponding right to deny that
consent even in the face of death.112 As a legislative response to the body
of jurisprudence that followed in the wake of Quinlan,113 the statute seeks
not only to balance the competing interests of the individual in selfdetermination114 and the state in the preservation of life,115 but also to
alleviate physicians’ concerns about potentially adverse legal and
professional consequences of complying with a patient’s request that life112. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) (“AngloAmerican law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determination. It
follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if
he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery,
or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation or form
of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute
his own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.”).
See also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985).
113. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.01[C]. Although
several of the early cases arose in the context of competent patients who objected
to treatment either on religious grounds or simply as a matter of personal
preference, the rapid emergence of advanced medical technology since the 1970s
provided the main impetus for the modern so-called “right-to-die” cases. Such
technology has enabled biological life to be sustained almost indefinitely by a
combination of devices for artificial respiration, circulation, feeding, and
hydration. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
114. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(1) (“[A]ll persons have the
fundamental right to control the decisions relating to their own medical care,
including the decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn
in instances where such persons are diagnosed as having a terminal and
irreversible condition.”).
115. See, e.g., id. § 40:1151.9(E) (“It is the policy of the state of Louisiana that
human life is of the highest and inestimable value through natural death. When
interpreting this Subpart, any ambiguity shall be interpreted to preserve human
life . . . .”); id. § 40:1151(B)(1) (“The legislature intends that the provisions of
this Subpart are permissive and voluntary.”); id. § 40:1151(B)(2) (“It is the intent
of the legislature that nothing in this Subpart shall be construed to require the
making of a declaration pursuant to this Subpart.”); id. § 40:1151.9(A) (“Nothing
in this Subpart shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve assistance to
suicide, mercy killing, or euthanasia; or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act
or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying.”); MEISEL
& CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.07[D].
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sustaining treatment be withheld or withdrawn.116 For all practical
purposes, the Act strikes that balance by codifying the principles reflected
in the body of jurisprudence and the pronouncements of professional
medical ethics concerning these significant questions that arose out of
Quinlan and its progeny.
Although the Act acknowledges in broad, general terms that patients
possess a fundamental right to control decisions related to the provision of
life-sustaining treatment, it does not attempt to define the precise
boundaries of that right.117 Those elusive limits remain the subject of
116. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.7(A)(1) (“Any health care facility
[or] physician . . . shall not be subject to criminal prosecution or civil liability or
be deemed to have engaged in unprofessional conduct as a result of the
withholding or the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures . . . in accordance
with the provisions of this Subpart.”). According to Meisel and Cerminara,
“[Advance directive] statutes are intended to provide assurance to individuals that
their wishes will be respected and to provide assurance to health care providers
that they will be immune from legal liability if they rely on these instructions.”
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.01[A].
117. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 2.01. These issues
originated when surrogates for permanently unconscious patients began to refuse
treatment that offered no hope of either restoring the patient’s capacity or
reversing the dying process. The most prominent of these cases in the United
States is Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. 497 U.S. 261, 328
(1990). See also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 22, at 170–81. Although
one’s exercise of this right is generally not controversial, it becomes problematic
when the refusal relates to treatment that would either prevent death or extend the
life of a patient who has been diagnosed with a terminal condition. This would
occur because a patient’s refusal of treatment in either of those cases would bring
his interest in self-determination into conflict with the state’s interest in preserving
life. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1239. Some commentators have
observed, however, that the courts predominately consider the state as having no
greater interest in preserving a particular life than does the individual whose life
is at issue. See, e.g., MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID
ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW & ETHICS 531 (7th ed. 2007). The U.S.
Supreme Court noted in Washington v. Glucksberg, however, that the states “‘may
properly decline to make judgments about the “quality” of life that a particular
individual may enjoy,’” and that “[t]his remains true, as Cruzan makes clear, even
for those who are near death.” 521 U.S. 702, 729–30 (1997) (quoting Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 282). Without regard to the perceived momentum of the states toward
qualifying their interests in preserving life, that fact would not bear upon the issue
when the patient has affirmatively requested treatment.
Meisel has summarized the general judicial consensus concerning this right
as follows: (1) patients, whether competent or incompetent, have both a common
law and a constitutional right to refuse treatment; (2) the state’s interest in
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discussion among scholars and practitioners in the disciplines of law,
medicine, and bioethics.118 Whether intentionally or not, this ambiguity
reflects the inherent tension between the competing interests of the
individual in the exercise of autonomy and the state in the preservation of
life, leaving these issues open to the sort of reflection necessary to fully
consider the broad societal implications technological developments in the
field of medicine pose as they come about. At the same time, the ambiguity
gives health care providers sufficient leeway to measure the bounds of
their obligations carefully from an ethical perspective and exercise
professional discretion in individual cases within the limits of those ethical
norms.119
The Act establishes a baseline for defining the point at which one’s
right to refuse treatment is absolute. The express terms of the statute
affirmatively recognize only the right of a terminally ill patient to refuse

opposing a competent patient’s right to forego life-sustaining treatment is
“virtually nonexistent,” and the state’s interest is “very weak” with respect to
incompetent patients who have a dim prognosis for recovery—although the state
would not likely disavow that interest if the patient has chosen not to exercise his
right to refuse treatment (as Professor Meisel notes, “The right of selfdetermination has . . . traditionally been thought to require that treatment not be
foregone without the informed consent of one legally authorized to provide it.”
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 2.06[A]); (3) decisions about lifesustaining treatment generally should take place in the clinical setting, although
courts are able to resolve disputes about those decisions; (4) surrogate decision
makers for incompetent patients should express the patient’s own preferences to
the extent made known prior to the loss of capacity, and to the extent the patient’s
preference is unknown, decisions should be made on the basis of the patient’s best
interests; (5) physicians and surrogates may rely on an incompetent patient’s
advance directive in ascertaining the patient’s preferences concerning lifesustaining procedures; (6) artificial nutrition and hydration is a form of medical
treatment that may be withheld or withdrawn under the same conditions as other
forms of medical treatment; and (7) the withholding or withdrawal of medical
treatment is both morally and ethically distinct from euthanasia and assisted
suicide, id. § 2.02; preventing suicide, see, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223;
preserving the ethical integrity of the medical profession, id.; and protecting
members of vulnerable groups, see, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
118. See, e.g., Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823, 830 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2010) (“[T]he public has at least an equal, if not greater, interest in a
patient’s right to live than in a patient’s right to die.”). The courts also have
recognized countervailing state interests in preventing suicide, safeguarding the
integrity of the medical profession, and protecting innocent third parties. See, e.g.,
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223; MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 13.06.
119. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, §§ 7.01–7.15.
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treatment that would merely prolong the dying process.120 The Act is silent
with respect to one’s right to withhold treatment that offers a reasonable
prospect of preserving life, leaving those questions to be resolved on a
case-by-case basis with reference to the analyses of the courts in prior
jurisprudence.121 Consistently with this silence, the statute provides that it
is not to be construed in a manner that would condone euthanasia or
assisted suicide.122 One might reasonably infer from the Act’s limitations
120. The Act provides that a competent patient has the right to personally
direct the withholding or withdrawal of treatment in advance, and that a surrogate
has the authority to do so on behalf of a “qualified patient” who has not made a
previous declaration. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.4. Notwithstanding the
general right, the Act expressly provides that a patient who has been diagnosed as
having a “terminal and irreversible condition” has the right to withhold or
withdraw “life-sustaining procedures,” which by definition serve only to prolong
the dying process. Id. § 40:1151.2A(1). The statute defines a “life-sustaining
procedure” as:
[A]ny medical procedure or intervention which . . . would serve only to
prolong the dying process for a person diagnosed as having a terminal
and irreversible condition, including such procedures as the invasive
administration of nutrition and hydration and the administration of
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. A “life-sustaining procedure” shall not
include any measure deemed necessary to provide comfort care.
Id. § 40:1151.1(8). The statute goes on to define a “terminal and irreversible
condition” as “a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which, within
reasonable medical judgment, would produce death and for which the application
of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to postpone the moment of death.”
Id. § 40:1151.1(14). The definitions of “life-sustaining procedure” and “terminal
and irreversible condition” are tautological.
121. Notwithstanding the narrow scope of these definitions, the Act provides
that “[t]he provisions of this Subpart are cumulative with existing law pertaining
to an individual’s right to consent or refuse to consent to medical or surgical
treatment.” Id. § 40:1151.9(C). According to Meisel and Cerminara, advance
directive statutes “are intended to preserve and supplement existing common law
and constitutional rights and not to supersede or limit them.” See MEISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.03[B][2].
122. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.9(A) provides: “Nothing in this
Subpart shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve assistance to suicide,
mercy killing, or euthanasia; or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or
omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying.” Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 14:32.12 defines “[c]riminal assistance to suicide” as “(1) The
intentional advising or encouraging of another person to commit suicide or the
providing of the physical means or the knowledge of such means to another person
for the purpose of enabling the other person to commit or attempt to commit
suicide[;]” or “(2) [t]he intentional advising, encouraging, or assisting of another
person to commit suicide, or the participation in any physical act which causes,
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a legislative intent to affirm the state’s traditional interest in preserving
life, both when a patient has chosen not to exercise his right to refuse
treatment as the Act recognizes and when he refuses treatment under
circumstances that lie beyond its scope.123
To give practical effect to the individual’s right of self-determination
and the state’s interest in preserving life, the statute incorporates a
narrowly tailored immunity scheme that insulates physicians from liability
when they follow their patients’ instructions concerning the provision of
life-sustaining treatment.124 In this manner, the statute reflects the
legislature’s intent to alleviate physicians’ concerns about the legal and
professional consequences of failing to provide treatment that would
prolong a patient’s life.125 This immunity, however, arises only when the
physician’s instructions fall within the express terms of the Act.
aids, abets, or assists another person in committing or attempting to commit
suicide.” Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.9(B) defines “suicide” as “the
intentional and deliberate act of taking one’s own life through the performance of
an act intended to result in death.” Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.9(C)
exempts from the prohibition against assisted suicide:
any licensed physician or other authorized licensed health care
professional who either: (1) [w]ithholds or withdraws medical treatment
in accordance with the provisions of LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.7[; or]
(2) prescribes, dispenses, or administers any medication, treatment, or
procedure if the intent is to relieve the patient’s pain or suffering and not
to cause death.
See also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.07[D].
123. The Act expressly states that one’s right to refuse treatment is a voluntary
matter that rests solely within the patient’s discretion. LA. REV. STAT. §
40:1151(B)(1)–(2).
124. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.7(A)(1) provides:
Any health care facility, physician, or other person acting under the
direction of a physician shall not be subject to criminal prosecution or
civil liability or be deemed to have engaged in unprofessional conduct
as a result of the withholding or the withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures from a qualified patient.
This immunity applies without regard to whether the patient expressed his decision
directly or indirectly through a surrogate. See also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra
note 3, § 7.01[C].
125. According to Professor Meisel, “statutes do not confer wholesale
immunity; rather, most confer qualified immunity conditioned on the physician’s
acting in good faith and pursuant to reasonable medical standards.” MEISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.10[E]; see also id. § 7.01[A] (“[Advance directive]
statutes are intended to provide assurance to individuals that their wishes will be
respected and to provide assurance to health care providers that they will be
immune from legal liability if they rely on these instructions.”).
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B. Application of the Natural Death Act to Palliative Sedation
Although aggressive palliative regimens are often necessary to
alleviate the pain and suffering patients experience during the latter stages
of a terminal illness, the Natural Death Act does not directly address the
provision of palliative care. The Act’s silence, however, neither negates
the Act’s relevance to this intervention nor renders it legally problematic.
Rather, the literal terms of the statute suggest that one’s right to receive
palliative care in Louisiana is incidental to and co-extensive with the
statutory scope of the right to refuse treatment.
This conclusion is grounded in two fundamental associations. First,
because pain management protocols are a fundamental part of the
professional standard of care, the physician’s obligation to mediate pain
associated with a patient’s underlying medical condition will continue so
long as the physician–patient relationship exists, and without regard to
whether the patient exercises his right to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment. Moreover, because the mere withholding of food and
fluids is accompanied by its own physical discomfort, a patient who refuses
treatment would be accorded the right to receive such palliative measures as
may be necessary to relieve any consequential physical distress. To construe
the Act otherwise would so militate against the exercise of one’s right to
refuse treatment as to practically deny its very existence.
In addition to this logical inference derived from the professional
standard of care, a careful construction of the statute itself implies the
legislature’s intent that the Act embrace palliative interventions such as
sedation to unconsciousness so long as the physician employs it in a
manner distinguished from assisted suicide and euthanasia. This
conclusion rests upon the manner in which the statute expresses the scope
of one’s right to refuse treatment, and which the Supreme Court’s opinions
in the assisted suicide cases of Washington v. Glucksberg126 and Vacco v.
Quill inform.127
The Act provides that a patient who has been diagnosed as having a
“terminal and irreversible condition” possesses the right to direct the
withholding or withdrawal of “life-sustaining procedures.”128 The statute
126. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
127. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
128. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(1) (entitled “purpose and findings”); id. §
1151.2(A)(1) (entitled “patient for himself”); id. § 40:1151.4(A) (entitled
“declaration for qualified patient”). Beyond this express recognition, the Act
states that “[t]he provisions of this Subpart are cumulative with existing law
pertaining to an individual’s right to consent or refuse to consent to medical or
surgical treatment.” Id. § 40:1151.9(C).
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defines a “terminal and irreversible condition” as: “[A] continual [and]
profound comatose state with no reasonable chance of recovery or a
condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which, within reasonable
medical judgment, would produce death and for which the application of
life-sustaining procedures would serve only to postpone the moment of
death.”129 It defines the related term, “life-sustaining procedure,” as:
[A]ny medical procedure or intervention which . . . would serve
only to prolong the dying process for a person diagnosed as having
a terminal and irreversible condition, including such procedures
as the invasive administration of nutrition and hydration and the
administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation. A “lifesustaining procedure” shall not include any measure deemed
necessary to provide comfort care.130
The fact that the statute excludes comfort care from the treatment to
be withheld when a terminally ill patient refuses artificial nutrition and
hydration suggests that one’s right to receive palliative care for the
discomfort associated with the absence of food and fluids is ancillary to
his refusal of treatment. To construe the text in this manner would give
practical effect to the Act’s underlying purpose of ensuring one’s right to
a natural death in an age of technology that enables biological life to be
extended almost indefinitely.131 On the other hand, to deny the right to
palliative care when a patient refuses treatment would effectively negate
the Natural Death Act itself.
At the same time, the Act’s general focus on a “natural” death would
preclude a patient from coupling a refusal of treatment with a contrived
129. Id. § 40:1151.1(14).
130. Id. § 40:1151.1(8) (emphasis added).
131. This general intent is most apparently reflected in the common name by
which the statute has come to be known: the Louisiana Natural Death Act. This
focus on natural death is also reflected in specific provisions of the statute. For
example, the Act provides that “[i]t is the policy of the state of Louisiana that
human life is of the highest and inestimable value through natural death.” Id. §
40:1151.9(E). This essence also is reflected in provisions of the Act that identify
the cause of one’s death as natural when it follows a refusal of life-sustaining
treatment. For example, the statute provides that “[t]he removal of life-support
systems or the failure to administer cardio-pulmonary resuscitation under this
Subpart shall not be deemed to be the cause of death for purposes of insurance
coverage.” Id. § 40:1151.9(B)(5). The Act also states that “[t]he withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient in accordance
with the provisions of this Subpart shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide.”
Id. § 40:1151.9(B)(1).
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claim for comfort care to disguise an act of euthanasia. Although the
statute acknowledges reasonable and practical distinctions between
decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment and acts that intentionally
cause death, it also anticipates the possibility that physicians might engage
in euthanasia or assisted suicide under the guise of mere palliation by
expressly rejecting such measures. For example, the Act expressly
provides that “[n]othing in this Subpart shall be construed to condone,
authorize or approve assistance to suicide, mercy killing, or euthanasia; or
to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other
than to permit the natural process of dying.”132 Taken together, these
express provisions of the statute suggest the legislature’s intention to
recognize a patient’s right to comfort care in the form of sedation to
unconsciousness, but only when the physician administers the sedative in
accordance with the Act’s primary focus on a natural death.
Consider, for example, the case of the esophageal cancer patient
previously mentioned who declines medical intervention in the form of
artificial nutrition and hydration when the disease progresses to the point
that he can no longer receive sufficient nutrition and hydration by
mouth.133 In addition to refusing treatment, he asks to be immediately
sedated to unconsciousness to relieve the suffering expected to accompany
the absence of food and fluids, with death by dehydration to be expected
within a few days.
The Act would accommodate the patient’s refusal of nutrition and
hydration under these circumstances. A careful parsing of the text would
reveal his inability to swallow as the requisite “terminal and irreversible

132. Id. § 40:1151.9(A)(1).
133. See supra Part I.B.
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condition,”134 and it would identify the artificial provision of nutrition and
hydration as the correlated “life-sustaining procedure” to be withheld.135
Just as the Act would accommodate this patient’s refusal of food and
fluids, it would likely embrace his request for sedation. This conclusion is
grounded in logic, and the statute implies it. Given the law’s express
recognition of the patient’s right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration
under these facts, as the requisite “life-sustaining procedure,” denying his
right to relieve the distress accompanying the exercise of that right would
be incongruous. Logic would compel the conclusion, not that the physician
sedated the patient and withheld treatment so he would die, but that the
physician sedated him to mitigate the suffering that otherwise would
attend his exercise of a right the Act expressly recognizes. Under the facts
of this example, the act of sedation is a form of comfort care that merely
facilitates one’s exercise of the right to refuse treatment. As previously
noted, the statute accommodates this view implicitly by excluding from
the definition of a “life-sustaining procedure” “any measure deemed
necessary to provide comfort care.”136
134. The Act defines a “[t]erminal and irreversible condition” as “a condition
caused by . . . disease . . . which . . . would produce death and for which the
application of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to postpone the
moment of death.” LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.1(14) (emphasis added). It is
significant to note that the literal terms of the statute do not identify the underlying
disease of esophageal cancer as the qualifying “terminal and irreversible
condition,” even though it is the disease that will eventually give rise to the
conditions that precipitate death. Rather, the statute defines a “terminal and
irreversible condition” as a “condition caused by” a disease; i.e., the statute
arguably applies only to a “condition” that is a consequence of the disease rather
than to the disease itself. Id. (emphasis added). Although this definition is
complex, it reflects the state’s continuing interest in the preservation of life. The
literal terms of the statute would not recognize the right of a patient diagnosed
with esophageal cancer to refuse nutrition and hydration merely because she had
been diagnosed with an illness that her physician has determined to be terminal.
The statute comes into play only when the disease manifests itself in the form of
a condition that requires the artificial provision of food and fluids.
135. Just as the Act defines a “terminal and irreversible condition” only with
reference to a “life-sustaining procedure,” it defines a “life-sustaining procedure” only
with reference to a “terminal and irreversible condition.” Id. § 40:1151.1(8), (14).
According to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.1(8), a “terminal and irreversible
condition” includes “any medical procedure or intervention which . . . would serve
only to prolong the dying process for a person diagnosed as having a terminal and
irreversible condition, including such procedures as the invasive administration of
nutrition and hydration . . . .” These tautological and narrow definitions suggest the
caution with which the legislature approached the Act.
136. Id. § 40:1151.1(8).
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This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Vacco
v. Quill,137 which recognized a distinction between assisted suicide and the
refusal of life-sustaining treatment on the basis of causation. Noting that a
patient who refuses treatment will die from the natural progression of the
underlying disease, the Court found that a physician who complies with a
patient’s request to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment does
not necessarily act with the intent to cause death. In contrast, because a
patient who receives a lethal concoction will die from the body’s reaction
to the foreign substance, the Court found that a physician who provides
assistance in committing suicide “must, necessarily and indubitably,
intend that the patient be made dead.”138 In the specific context of sedation
to unconsciousness, however, the Quill Court refused to infer a physician’s
intent to cause death when he employs aggressive palliative measures
merely to control a patient’s pain, implicitly acknowledging the doctrine
of double effect.139
Although this analysis may obviate most concerns about the sort of
potentially self-serving expressions of “intent” that legitimately disturb
those who reject sedation to unconsciousness on the grounds that it is
analogous to euthanasia, it cannot alleviate those concerns in all cases.
Consider, for example, the case of the rheumatoid arthritis patient
previously discussed who seeks to be sedated immediately and perpetually
to unconsciousness as the only possible means of providing relief from his
intractable pain.140 Recognizing that it would be futile to receive food and
fluids when he is to be rendered permanently unconscious, the patient also
asks that nutrition and hydration be withheld and that he be allowed to die.
137. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
138. Id. at 802 (quoting Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.,
2d Sess., 367 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
139. Quill, 521 U.S. at 802. This reasoning found considerable support among
amici bioethics professors who argued that the principle of double effect
encompassed aggressive palliative measures. According to these professors:
Providing medication to control pain has always been a legitimate and
lawful medical act, even if death . . . is risked. Most invasive medical
interventions carry the risk of death or disability. But if a patient dies
during surgery, the surgeon is not guilty of homicide. This is because
there is a real difference between an intended result and an unintended
but accepted consequence of medical care where the goal is to benefit
the patient.
Brief for Bioethics Professors Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, Vacco
v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858, 96-110).
140. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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The facts of this case present a complexity not found in the esophageal
cancer case discussed above. In that case, the progression of the disease
directly caused the patient’s inability to receive sufficient nutrition by
mouth, thereby rendering him dependent upon artificial sustenance. It was
this direct linkage between the patient’s disease process and his inability
to receive food and fluids on his own that satisfied the Act’s requisite
“terminal and irreversible condition” and justified the withholding of
artificial nutrition and hydration as a “life-sustaining procedure.”141
This necessary linkage is tenuous, if not broken, in the case of the
rheumatoid arthritis patient because his dependence on artificial nutrition
and hydration would result from the administration of the sedative rather
than the natural progression of the disease. This focus on the cause of the
patient’s need for the treatment he seeks to decline is grounded in a careful
reading of the statute.
As previously noted, the Act provides that a patient who has been
diagnosed as having a terminal and irreversible condition may direct the
withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining procedure.142 The statute
employs the words “terminal and irreversible condition” as a specific term
of art that means “a condition caused by . . . disease . . . which . . . would
produce death and for which the application of life-sustaining procedures
would serve only to postpone the moment of death.”143 Although
rheumatoid arthritis may be terminal and irreversible in a colloquial sense,
the disease itself would not constitute a “terminal and irreversible
condition” within the meaning of the Act; only a condition “caused by”
the disease would fall within that definition. The patient’s right under the
Act to refuse nutrition and hydration therefore would turn on the cause of
his inability to naturally receive sustenance.
Application of the Act would be clearest if the patient’s dependence
on artificial nutrition and hydration could be directly tied to the
progression of the disease process rather than the sedative. If, however,
the patient’s inability to receive sustenance arose only when he was
sedated to unconsciousness, it would be two steps removed from the
underlying illness—the pain caused by the disease and the sedation
administered to relieve his discomfort. Application of the Act would be
questionable if this linkage were so tenuous as to define the sedative rather
than the disease as the cause of his need for the artificial nutrition and
hydration he seeks to refuse.144
141. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
142. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.2 (2019).
143. Id. § 40:1151.1(14) (emphasis added).
144. Although the issue is raised here in the context of a patient who is
immediately sedated to unconsciousness, the same definitional problem would
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An alternative view might avoid this uncertainty by applying a
practical “but-for” causation analysis. By focusing on the fact that the act
of sedation presented the only possible remedy to the intractable pain
associated with the patient’s disease, this view would inextricably link the
act of sedation with the patient’s pain in a way that identifies the disease
as the ultimate cause of his need for artificial sustenance; after being
sedated to unconsciousness to remedy his suffering caused by the disease,
he would become dependent on artificial nutrition and hydration. By
identifying the act of sedation with the patient’s pain and, in turn,
identifying solely his disease as inducing his pain, this argument would
suggest that the Act may accommodate both the sedation and the
consequential withholding of nutrition and hydration.
Without regard to the reasonable arguments for or against application
of the Act in this case, however, those very arguments reveal an ambiguity
in the statute that may deny one’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
after having intentionally created the need for it. This situation may occur
because the Act itself emphasizes as a matter of public policy that “human
life is of the highest and inestimable value through natural death. When
interpreting this Subpart, any ambiguity shall be interpreted to preserve
human life . . . .”145
These uncertainties flow from the Act’s structural focus on the causal
relationship between the patient’s medical condition and the need for
artificial nutrition and hydration. The Act’s focus is admittedly problematic
when the suffering related to the underlying disease or injury can be relieved
by sedation alone—i.e., when it would be unnecessary to withhold nutrition
and hydration to relieve suffering, but futile to artificially provide it when
the patient is to be maintained in an unconscious state until death.
Although the Act’s structural focus on causation may be problematic
when applied in such cases, it nevertheless provides an objective reference
point for ensuring the state’s ability to invoke its interest in preserving life.
Without the requisite causal relationship between a patient’s illness or
injury and the need for artificial nutrition and hydration—and however
distant the horizon of a “natural” death—virtually any terminal medical
arise under the Act in terms of causation when the sedation is administered
proportionately with the patient’s level of pain. Consider, for example, the case
of a patient who, in the advanced stages of lung cancer, requests morphine and
other sedatives in doses that increase proportionately as the intensity of his
distress deepens with the progression of the disease. Expecting to eventually
receive sedatives in doses that render him permanently unconscious, the patient
asks that his physician withhold nutrition and hydration when he becomes unable
to ingest them on his own. See, e.g., MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 3, § 7.06.
145. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(E).
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condition would suffice to recognize a patient’s right to dramatically
accelerate the moment of death by coupling sedation to unconsciousness
and the withholding of sustenance. To so disregard causation would be
effectively to endorse euthanasia and convert the Act from its intended
purpose into a safe harbor for its antithesis.
At the core of this unresolved question is the fundamental difficulty of
finding an appropriate way to balance the competing interests of the
patient in self-determination and the state in preserving life. The fact that
the legislature defined that balance in the Act with reference to causation,
however, does not suggest that one’s right to palliative care is necessarily
limited to cases that neatly fit into the statutory text; it simply reflects the
fact that the legislature chose not to address the appropriate balance
between the competing interests of the individual and the state in all
circumstances. Cases that fall outside the purview of the Act therefore
remain subject to resolution on an individual basis with reference to the
ethical norms of the medical profession and the principles reflected in the
jurisprudence.146
In the rheumatoid arthritis case, for example, one might deny an intent
to cause death by grounding an argument in the doctrine of double effect
if the physician employed the sedative at the minimum dosage necessary
to relieve the patient’s pain and suffering. This perspective suggests that
the patient’s simultaneous loss of consciousness and the natural ability to
receive nutrition and hydration—the latter of which would cause his
death—were merely foreseeable but unintended consequences of a
sedative employed at the minimum dosage necessary to relieve the
suffering caused by his disease. Under this reasoning, the act of sedating
the patient to unconsciousness would be treated as if it had been
proportionally employed, because even proportionate sedation would
eventually render the patient unconscious and naturally unable to receive
food and fluids. Viewing sedation as proportionately employed would
seek to circumvent the problematic causation element in the Act’s
definition of a “terminal and irreversible condition” simply by looking
beyond the limited scope of the Act to find an independent basis on which
to justify the patient’s refusal of treatment.147
146. The Act expressly invokes the jurisprudence in cases that do not fall
within its limited scope. According to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1151.9(C):
“The provisions of this Subpart are cumulative with existing law pertaining to an
individual’s right to consent or refuse to consent to medical or surgical treatment.”
147. Commentators have expressed a wide range of views about how to
resolve the tension in cases that implicate both the patient’s need for pain relief
and societal concerns about euthanasia and the ethical integrity of the medical
profession. See, e.g., Roger S. Magnusson, The Devil’s Choice: Re-Thinking Law,
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Not everyone, however, would subscribe to this application of the
double effect doctrine, even if the circumstances suggest that it would be
futile to provide food and fluids when the patient is to be maintained in a
perpetually unconscious state to relieve his intractable suffering. A
cautious observer might view this analysis as distorting the doctrine
beyond its intended bounds by disguising the withholding of nutrition and
hydration as a passive measure when, in fact, it constitutes an affirmative
act wholly unrelated to the patient’s legitimate need for pain relief. This
argument is most compelling when the act of sedation would satisfy that
need on its own, revealing the withholding of treatment as the proximate
cause of the patient’s death.
CONCLUSION
It is not uncommon for patients in the latter stages of a terminal illness
to request that life-sustaining treatment be withheld or withdrawn when they
believe that the burden of additional treatment will outweigh the benefit of
an extended life. Patients at the end of life may also simultaneously ask to
be sedated to unconsciousness as a palliative measure to relieve the suffering
that is likely to attend the termination of their treatments. Although the
Natural Death Act addresses the rights of patients who seek to withhold or
withdraw treatment and the corresponding obligations of their physicians to
comply with patients’ directives, it does not directly speak to those rights
and obligations with respect to active palliative interventions such as
sedation to unconsciousness. Yet, the natural interrelationship that exists
between the provision of palliative care and the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment suggests that the Act offers a meaningful
reference point for informing that inquiry.
The Act is relevant because sedation to unconsciousness is a logical
and sometimes necessary extension of one’s right to refuse the sort of lifesustaining treatment with which the statute is primarily concerned. The
Act also incorporates the legal and ethical distinction between affirmative
interventions intended to accelerate the moment of death—such as
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia—and merely passive decisions
to withhold or withdraw methods of treatment that would only prolong the
dying process.
The Act strikes a delicate but uncertain balance when seeking to define
an individual’s rights with respect to these passive and active interventions.
The statute clearly reflects the concept that one’s right to refuse life-

Ethics and Symptom Relief in Palliative Care, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 559, 559–
69 (2006); McStay, supra note 14; Levine, supra note 9.
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sustaining treatment does not rest on an abstract notion of individual
autonomy that is so broad as to encompass an active intervention designed
to bring about his death. By its own terms, the law expressly disavows
affirmative interventions such as euthanasia and assisted suicide. At the
same time, however, the Act acknowledges implicitly the practical difficulty
of characterizing as a crime any circumstance in which death results from
the passive refusal of treatment, simply because the facts of each case tend
to be both unique and complex. Rather, these cases are marked by subtle
differences and subjective questions of causation and intent that effectively
preclude the law from universally condemning the practice of sedation to
unconsciousness, even when the sedative is combined with a patient’s
decision to withhold treatment in the form of artificial nutrition and
hydration.
Although the Act is sometimes ambiguous when applied in the context
of these interventions, that ambiguity is not surprising, particularly in light
of the challenging practical and ethical issues that accompany the
provision of palliative care at the end of life. Nor is the present
ambivalence necessarily troubling, because it allows the sort of reflection
necessary to fully consider the implications life-terminating interventions
pose before they are implemented. At the same time, it gives health care
providers sufficient leeway to carefully measure the bounds of their
obligations from an ethical perspective and exercise professional
discretion in individual cases within those limits.

